Practical VPNs with strongSwan, Shorewall, Linux firewalls and OpenWRT routers


There is intense interest in communications privacy at the moment thanks to the Snowden scandal. Open source software has offered credible solutions for privacy and encryption for many years. Sadly, making these solutions work together is not always plug-and-play.

In fact, secure networking, like VoIP, has been plagued by problems with interoperability and firewall/filtering issues although now the solutions are starting to become apparent. Here I will look at some of them, such as the use of firewall zones to simplify management or the use of ECDSA certificates to avoid UDP fragmentation problems. I've drawn together a lot of essential tips from different documents and mailing list discussions to demonstrate how to solve a real-world networking problem.

A typical network scenario and requirements

Here is a diagram of the network that will be used to help us examine the capabilities of these open source solutions.

Some comments about the diagram:

Package mayhem

The major components are packaged on all the major Linux distributions. Nonetheless, in every case, I found that it is necessary to re-compile fresh strongSwan packages from sources. It is not so hard to do but it is necessary and worth the effort. Here are related blog entries where I provide the details about how to re-build fresh versions of the official packages with all necessary features enabled:

Using X.509 certificates as a standard feature of the VPN

For convenience, many people building a point-to-point VPN start with passwords (sometimes referred to as pre-shared keys (PSK)) as a security mechanism. As the VPN grows, passwords become unmanageable.

In this solution, we only look at how to build a VPN secured by X.509 certificates. The certificate concept is not hard.

In this scenario, there are a few things that make it particularly easy to work with certificates:

UDP fragmentation during IPsec IKEv2 key exchange and ECDSA

A common problem for IPsec VPNs using X.509 certificates is the fragmentation of key exchange datagrams during session setup. Sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn't. Various workarounds exist, such as keeping copies of all certificates from potential peers on every host. As the network grows, this becomes inconvenient to maintain and to some extent it eliminates the benefits of using PKI.

Fortunately, there is a solution: Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). Many people currently use RSA key-pairs. Best practice suggests using RSA keys of at least 2048 bits and often 4096 bits. Using ECC with a smaller 384-bit key is considered to be equivalent to a 7680 bit RSA key pair. Consequently, ECDSA certificates are much smaller than RSA certificates. Furthermore, at these key sizes, the key exchange packets are almost always smaller than the typical 1500 byte MTU.

A further demand for ECDSA is arising due to the use of ECC within smart cards. Many smartcards don't support any RSA key larger than 2048 bits. The highly secure 384-bit ECC key is implemented in quite a few common smart cards. Smart card vendors have shown a preference for the ECC keys due to the US Government's preference for ECC and the lower computational overheads make them more suitable for constrained execution environments. Anyone who wants to use smart cards as part of their VPN or general IT security now, or in the future, needs to consider ECC/ECDSA.

Making the network simple with Shorewall zones

For this example, we are not just taking some easy point-to-point example. We have a real-world, multi-site, multi-device network with road warriors. Simplifying this architecture is important to help us understand and secure it. The solution? Each of these is abstracted to a "zone" in Shorewall. In the diagram above, the zone names are in square brackets. The purpose of each zone is described below:

Zone nameDescription
locThis is the private LAN and contains servers like databases, private source code respositories and NFS file servers
dmzThis is the DMZ and contains web servers that are accessible from the public internet. Some of these servers talk to databases or message queues in the LAN network loc
vpn_aThese are road warriors that are not very trustworthy, such as mobile devices. They are occasionally stolen and usually full of spyware (referred to by users as "apps"). They have limited access to ports on some DMZ servers, e.g. for sending and receiving mail using SMTP and IMAP (those ports are not exposed to the public Internet at large). They use the VPN tunnel for general internet access/browsing, to avoid surveillance by their mobile carrier.
vpn_bThese are managed laptops that have a low probability of malware infection. They may well be using smart cards for access control. Consequently, they are more trusted than the vpn_a users and have access to some extra intranet pages and file servers. Like the smart-phone users, they use the VPN tunnel for general internet access/browsing, to avoid surveillance by third-party wifi hotspot operators.
vpn_cThis firewall zone represents remote sites with managed hardware, such as branch offices or home networks with IPsec routers running OpenWRT.
custThese are servers hosted for third-parties or collaborative testing/development purposes. They have their own firewall arrangements if necessary.
netThis zone represents traffic from the public Internet.

A practical Shorewall configuration

Shorewall is chosen to manage the iptables and ip6tables firewall rules. Shorewall provides a level of abstraction that makes netfilter much more manageable than manual iptables scripting. The Shorewall concept of zones is very similar to the zones implemented in OpenWRT and this is an extremely useful paradigm for firewall management.

Practical configuration of Shorewall is very well explained in the Shorewall quick start. The one thing that is not immediately obvious is a strategy for planning the contents of the /etc/shorewall/policy and /etc/shorewall/rules files. The exact details for making it work effectively with a modern IPsec VPN are not explained in a single document, so I've gathered those details below as well.

An effective way to plan the Shorewall zone configuration is with a table like this:

Destination zone
locdmzvpn_avpn_bvpn_ccustnet
Source zoneloc\✔✔✔✔✔✔
dmz?\XXX✔✔
vpn_a??\XX✔✔
vpn_b??X\X✔✔
vpn_cX✔✔✔\✔✔
custX?XXX\✔
netX?XXX✔\

The symbols in the table are defined:

SymbolMeaning
✔ACCEPT in policy file
XREJECT or DROP in policy file
?REJECT or DROP in policy file, but ACCEPT some specific ports in the rules file

Naturally, this modelling technique is valid for both IPv4 and IPv6 firewalling (with Shorewall6)

Looking at the diagram in two dimensions, it is easy to spot patterns. Each pattern can be condensed into a single entry in the rules file. For example, it is clear from the first row that the loc zone can access all other zones. That can be expressed very concisely with a single line in the policy file:

loc all ACCEPT

Specific Shorewall tips for use with IPsec VPNs and strongSwan

Shorewall has several web pages dedicated to VPNs, including the IPsec specific documentation.. Personally, I found that I had to gather a few details from several of these pages to make an optimal solution. Here are those tips:

Otherwise, just follow the typical examples from the Shorewall quick start guide and configure it to work the way you want.

Here is an example /etc/shorewall/zones file:

fw firewall
net ipv4
dmz ipv4
loc ipv4
cust ipv4
vpn_a ipsec mode=tunnel mss=1024
vpn_b ipsec mode=tunnel mss=1024
vpn_c ipsec mode=tunnel mss=1024

Here is an example /etc/shorewall/hosts file describing the VPN ranges from the diagram:

vpn_a eth0:10.1.100.0/24 ipsec
vpn_b eth0:10.1.200.0/24 ipsec
vpn_c eth0:192.168.1.0/24 ipsec

Here is an example /etc/shorewall/policy file based on the table above:

loc all ACCEPT
vpn_c all ACCEPT
cust net ACCEPT
net cust ACCEPT
all all REJECT

Here is an example /etc/shorewall/rules file based on the network:

SECTION ALL

# allow connections to the firewall itself to start VPNs:
# Rule  source    dest    protocol/port details
ACCEPT   all       fw                ah
ACCEPT   all       fw                esp
ACCEPT   all       fw                udp 500
ACCEPT   all       fw                udp 4500

# allow access to HTTP servers in DMZ:
ACCEPT   all       dmz               tcp 80

# allow connections from HTTP servers to MySQL database in private LAN:
ACCEPT   dmz       loc:10.2.0.43     tcp 3306

# allow connections from all VPN users to IMAPS server in private LAN:
ACCEPT vpn_a,vpn_b,vpn_c loc:10.2.0.58 tcp 993

# allow VPN users (but not the smartphones in vpn_a) to the
# PostgresQL database for PostBooks accounting system:
ACCEPT vpn_b,vpn_c loc:10.2.0.48      tcp 5432

SECTION ESTABLISHED
ACCEPT   all       all

SECTION RELATED
ACCEPT   all       all

Once the files are created, Shorewall can be easily activated with:

# shorewall compile && shorewall restart

strongSwan IPsec VPN setup

Like Shorewall, strongSwan is also very well documented and I'm just going to focus on those specific areas that are relevant to this type of VPN project.

Central firewall/VPN gateway configuration

Although they are not present in the diagram, IPv6 networks are also configured in these strongSwan examples. It is very easy to combine IPv4 and IPv6 into a single /etc/ipsec.conf file. As long as the road-warriors have leftsourceip=%config4,%config6 in their own configurations, they will operate dual-stack IPv4/IPv6 whenver they connect to the VPN.

Here is an example /etc/ipsec.conf for the central VPN gateway:

config setup
        charonstart=yes
        charondebug=all
        plutostart=no

conn %default
        ikelifetime=60m
        keylife=20m
        rekeymargin=3m
        keyingtries=1
        keyexchange=ikev2

conn branch1
        left=198.51.100.1
        leftsubnet=203.0.113.0/24,10.0.0.0/8,2001:DB8:12:80:/64
        leftcert=fw1Cert.der
        leftid=@fw1.example.org
        leftfirewall=no
        lefthostaccess=no
        right=%any
        rightid=@branch1-fw.example.org
        rightsubnet=192.168.1.0/24
        auto=add

conn rw_vpn_a
        left=198.51.100.1
        leftsubnet=0.0.0.0/0,::0/0
        leftcert=fw1Cert.der
        leftid=@fw1.example.org
        leftfirewall=no
        lefthostaccess=no
        right=%any
        rightid="OU=vpn_a, CN=*"
        rightsourceip=10.1.100.0/24,2001:DB8:1000:100::/64
        auto=add

conn rw_vpn_b
        left=198.51.100.1
        leftsubnet=0.0.0.0/0,::0/0
        leftcert=fw1Cert.der
        leftid=@fw1.example.org
        leftfirewall=no
        lefthostaccess=no
        right=%any
        rightid="OU=vpn_b, CN=*"
        rightsourceip=10.1.200.0/24,2001:DB8:1000:200::/64
        auto=add

Sample branch office or home router VPN configuration

Here is an example /etc/ipsec.conf for the Linux server or OpenWRT VPN at the branch office or home:

conn head_office
        left=%defaultroute
        leftid=@branch1-fw.example.org
        leftcert=branch1-fwCert.der
        leftsubnet=192.168.1.0/24,2001:DB8:12:80:/64
        leftfirewall=no
        lefthostaccess=no
        right=fw1.example.org
        rightid=@fw1.example.org
        rightsubnet=203.0.113.0/24,10.0.0.0/8,2001:DB8:1000::/52
        auto=start

# notice we only allow vpn_b users, not vpn_a
# these users are given virtual IPs from our own
# 192.168.1.0 subnet
conn rw_vpn_b
        left=branch1-fw.example.org
        leftsubnet=192.168.1.0/24,2001:DB8:12:80:/64
        leftcert=branch1-fwCert.der
        leftid=@branch1-fw.example.org
        leftfirewall=no
        lefthostaccess=no
        right=%any
        rightid="OU=vpn_b, CN=*"
        rightsourceip=192.168.1.160/27,2001:DB8:12:80::8000/116
        auto=add

Further topics

Shorewall and Shorewall6 don't currently support a unified configuration. This can make it slightly tedious to duplicate rules between the two IP variations. However, the syntax for IPv4 and IPv6 configuration is virtually identical.

Shorewall only currently supports Linux netfilter rules. In theory it could be extended to support other types of firewall API, such as pf used by OpenBSD and the related BSD family of systems.

A more advanced architecture would split the single firewall into multiple firewall hosts, like the inner and outer walls of a large castle. The VPN gateway would also become a standalone host in the DMZ. This would require more complex routing table entries.

Smart cards with PIN numbers provide an effective form of two-factor authentication that can protect certificates for remote users. Smart cards are documented well by strongSwan already so I haven't repeated any of that material in this article.

Managing a private X.509 certificate authority in practice may require slightly more effort than I've described, especially when an organisation grows. Small networks and home users don't need to worry about these details too much, but for most deployments it is necessary to consider things like certificate revocation lists and special schemes to protect the root certificate's private key. EJBCA is one open source project that might help.

Some users may want to consider ways to prevent the road-warriors from accidentally browsing the Internet when the IPsec tunnel is not active. Such policies could be implemented with some basic iptables firewalls rules in the road-warrior devices.

Summary

Using these strategies and configuration tips, planning and building a VPN will hopefully be much simpler. Please feel free to ask questions on the mailing lists for any of the projects discussed in this blog.

More news and policy statements regarding my campaign for Dublin Bay South:

Please print my brochure if you want Ireland to change